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Whistleblowing by administrative employees in local governments can bring critical knowl-
edge about misconduct and failed policy outcomes and priorities to the attention of politicians.
This article examines whether (1) whistleblowing to politicians is considered acceptable among
politicians and administrative employees, (2) politicians receive whistleblowing cases and how
those who do so handle the case, and (3) contact patterns between politicians and administra-
tive employees influence the whistleblowing activity and the action taken by the politicians to
address wrongdoing. The article departs from the theory of pillars of institutions and the ten-
sions between and within institutional pillars to analyse unique data from a survey based on
the vignette method and actual whistleblowing among politicians (N 5 400) and employees
(N 5 373) from 20 Norwegian municipalities. The analysis shows that the degree of contact
between politicians and administrative employees is correlated with positive perceptions of
whistleblowing and constructive handling of wrongdoing reports by the politicians.
Introduction
Over the past decades, the public sector has been influenced by organisational
models and management strategies that have promoted separation between
politicians and administrative staff. It has been argued that limited contact
between the two spheres will promote transparency and responsibility, as sup-
ported in the revision of the Norwegian Local Government Act of 1992 (here-
after LGA). This type of separation of politics and administration can be
regarded as an intentional attempt to de-institutionalise a practice that has
deep roots in Norwegian municipalities (Trygstad 2004). As noted by scholars
within institutional theory, changes in attitudes and actions may be difficult to
accomplish (Scott 1995; Pierson 2004; Engelstad 2015). However, the revision
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of the LGA is not the only change that may affect the contact pattern and the
whistleblowing process. In 2004, the freedom of expression of employees
were strengthened in the Norwegian constitution, and in 2007, legal protection
of employees who act as whistleblowers came into force.
In this article, we try to identify changes by examining the contact pattern
between administrative staff and politicians in local governments and dis-
cover whether the degree of this contact affects whistleblowing activity and
the actions of politicians to address wrongdoing. As formal employers in
municipalities, politicians can serve as a well-functioning whistleblowing
channel because they have the authority to effect change in an organisation.
We define ‘whistleblowing’ ‘as the disclosure by organisation members (for-
mer or current) of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices under the control
of their employers to persons or organisations that may be able to effect
action’ (Near & Miceli, 1985, 4; Near et al. 2004; Miceli et al. 2008, 8). To the
best of our knowledge, there are no published studies on politicians handling
whistleblowing in the Nordic countries or the Nordic labour market. There-
fore, our study is explorative and breaks new empirical ground. We use insti-
tutional theory as a platform for understanding how tensions between and
within regulative and normative pillars (Scott 1995) in local governments can
affect the contact patterns and communication or contact between politicians
and employees in the municipalities. The term ‘communication’ is often used
in a broad sense (cf. Smidts et al. 2001; Bartels et al. 2010; Wynia et al. 2010),
which is consistent with the use of the term in this article.
Whistleblowing is important for various reasons; it can secure or improve
the welfare of both employees and citizens and it promotes democracy
because the right to expression is an essential precondition. Whistleblowing
also promotes organisational learning and development through the report-
ing of misconduct that directly or indirectly acts against organisational goals,
ethical guidelines or legislation. Hence, whistleblowing may also be important
for organisational efficiency. Actions that constitute wrongdoing may vary
within and between organisations (Skivenes & Trygstad 2014). Defining
wrongdoing is a complicated and contested task, which makes it potentially
controversial. Opinions may differ regarding what constitutes wrongdoing as
well as the appropriate form of action. However, in the public sector, the
need to identify and handle it is of particular importance as organisational
wrongdoing may harm not only organisational goals and its members, but
also innocent third parties who depend on welfare services from the munici-
pality. Miceli et al. (2012, 942) note that organisational wrongdoing even has
a negative impact on those who observe it:
[Wrongdoing] is associated with demoralisation and negative signalling. Specifically,
observing wrongdoing generally was associated with lower levels of perceived organisa-
tional support (POS) and perceived channel justice (PCJ).
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Their analysis shows that if the wrongdoing is corrected (or believed to
have been corrected), the negative effects of having observed wrongdoing
may be minimised or eliminated.
Obviously, the correction of wrongdoing requires that wrongdoing be
detected – that someone blow the whistle. In this article, we examine whether
whistleblowing to politicians is considered acceptable among politicians and
administrative employees; whether politicians receive whistleblowing cases and
how those who do handle the case; and whether the contact patterns between
politicians and administrative employees influence the whistleblowing activity
and the action taken by the politicians to address wrongdoing.
The article is organised as follows. We begin by presenting a theoretical
platform and an analytical framework, before providing a brief overview
of local governments and whistleblowing research in the Norwegian labour
market. Our methodology is then outlined, and our findings are presented.
The article concludes with discussion and some remarks.
Institutional Pillars and Norwegian Local
Government
Historically, there have been close ties between politicians and employees
in Norwegian municipalities. In previous decades, these ties have been
debated and changes in the LGA in 1992 emphasised the importance of
separating the political sphere from the administrative sphere (Trygstad
2004). The LGA was influenced by New Public Management (NPM),
which also underlined the separation of the two spheres. The separation
was viewed as essential for the reduction of administrative influence on
political issues and to enable the management to govern in line with polit-
ical goals without day-to-day political interference (Trygstad 2004; Chris-
tensen et al. 2009). The intention of the new statutes and NPM were to
establish new practices and actions. However, several scholars of institu-
tional theory argue that the social order normally remains stable, depend-
ing on paths chosen in the past. Maintaining this order becomes even
more difficult the more embedded an action or a practice is because time
invested is a decisive factor (Pierson 2004). Different actors may have
much to lose by changing their actions. The social order will remain stable
until an exogenous shock appears; then a new policy will emerge (Engel-
stad 2015, 37). The approach of Mahoney and Thelen (2010) represents
an alternative perspective. They argue that institutional change is continu-
ously ongoing because of the aggregate effects of a multitude of actions.
Our point of departure is legal changes that have an effect on the regu-
lative pillar. According to Scott, the regulative pillar is one of three pillars
that constitute an institution:
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Institutions consist of cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities that
provide stability and meaning to social behaviour. Institutions are transported by various
carriers – cultures, structures, and routines – and they operate at multiple levels of juris-
diction. (Scott 1995, 33)
The pillars represent the structures and activities that are intended to
bring stability and meaning to social contexts. In this article, we focus on
the regulative and normative pillars. Legal amendments are related to the
regulative pillar, whereas ideas on organisation and management are
related to the normative pillar. According to Scott (1995), these two pillars
will often mutually support each other, as is evident in Norway with the
changes in the LGA, the separation of the political and administrative
spheres, and the influence of NPM. However, the introduction of strength-
ened protection of the freedom of expression in the Constitution and the
right to give notification of wrongdoing included in the Work Environ-
ment Act of 2005 (hereafter WEA) can activate tensions in both the nor-
mative and the regulative pillars, and activated powers and interests may
pull the pillars in different directions. Thus, regulative and normative ten-
sions in local governments are likely to result in complex institutional
dynamics. For example, the contact patterns between politicians and
employees may be affected by the revision or introduction of new statutes
that are intended to provide the reaffirmation of an established practice
or changes in practices and actions. The legislator’s intentions to minimise
the contact between politicians and employees may be de-prioritised in
favour of stronger protection of the freedom of expression and the right
to notify wrongdoing.
Regulative Changes
The regulative pillar is based on formal statutes, agreements, policies and
principles that constitute the framework for social action. This pillar is
also based on the implementation of potential sanctions in cases in which
statutes or agreements are violated (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Scott 1995)
and prescribe the acceptable and unacceptable acts of social partners. In
our context, the LGA, Section 100 of the Constitution and the provisions
on notification in the WEA form part of the regulative pillar in establish-
ing guidelines for and imposing restrictions on actions. We describe the
relevant amendments below.
In 1992, Norway passed a new Government Act. The law advocated
restricted contact between the political and administrative levels of gov-
ernment (cf. Sections 22 and 23). All contact between the two levels was
to be channelled through the mayor on the political side and the council-
lor on the administrative side. The aim of limiting contact between the
political and administrative levels should be understood in light of the
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dominant position of the 1980s and 1990s, during which employees, groups
of professions and union representatives were regarded as excessively
influential in the processes of policy and decision making. The critique
was that these actors influenced policy through both official and unofficial
channels. Close ties between public officials and union representatives
were another matter, and some industries enjoyed more influence over the
outcome of political decisions than what was fair, given their standing in
the welfare state (Bukve & Offerdal 2002). Concepts such as ‘collective
disarray’ (‘samrøre’ in Norwegian) were used to describe the sometimes
tangled and complex streams of communication and information between
actors and the co-movement of several streams of information. One of the
primary objectives of the LGA was to make the public sector simpler and
remove the ambiguous nature with which business was conducted. In pre-
paratory work on the LGA, it was decreed that ‘reliable governance,
unambiguous chains of command and responsibilities’ should characterise
the organisation’. Managerial prerogatives were also strongly emphasised.
In 2004 and 2007, changes in the Constitution and the WEA, respec-
tively, came into force. The general right to free expression is protected
by Section 100 of the Constitution and Article 10 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights. The new Section 100 has strengthened the
freedom of expression of employees. In principle, employees enjoy the
same freedom of expression as everyone else (Elvestad 2011, 31). Grounds
must be given for restricting the freedom of expression of employees –
not the reverse. Moreover, a government white paper (nr. 26, 2003–4: 14)
states that employees are likely to be particularly motivated to participate
in public debate when they possess specialised knowledge in a field that is
being discussed and debated. Although the purpose of the new Section
100 was to strengthen the right of employees to free expression, the provi-
sions on notification were also introduced to protect employees against
accusations of disloyalty. Employees’ right to disclose wrongdoing is regu-
lated in Section 100 of the Norwegian Constitution as well as the WEA.
According to the WEA, an employee has ‘a right to notify concerning
censurable conditions at the undertaking’ and concerns both internal and
external whistleblowing. Section 2-4(2) of the WEA states that the
employee must ‘follow the appropriate procedures in connection with
such notification’; nevertheless, there is also ‘the right to notify in accord-
ance with the duty to notify or the undertaking’s routines for notification’.
Furthermore, reporting wrongdoing to union representatives and/or the
health and security inspector and supervisory authorities (e.g., the Norwe-
gian Directorate of Labour Inspection) is always regarded as appropriate,
and the same is true for reporting to an immediate supervisor or an
employer. There is regulative tension when the LGA states that local poli-
ticians are formal employers, at the same time as the WEA underlines
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that reporting wrongdoing to a person within the organisation – such as
an immediate supervisor, union representatives and/or the health and
security inspector – or the employer is regarded as an appropriate method
of action. Section 2-4(3) emphasise the role of the employer, who has to
prove that notification was not made in accordance with this section. Sec-
tion 2-5 of the WEA prohibits retaliation against an employee who
invokes or attempts to invoke Section 2-4; if there is reason to believe
that retaliation has occurred, it is assumed to have taken place unless the
employer ‘substantiates otherwise’. Irrespective of the fault of the
employer, compensation is available if the court believes it reasonable
given all circumstances. In relation to facilitating notification, Section 3-6
of the WEA requires employers to ‘develop routines for internal notifica-
tion or implement other measures that facilitate notification concerning
censurable conditions . . . if the circumstances in the undertaking so
indicate’.
Normative Changes
The regulative changes can be viewed partly as a result of normative
changes and partly as a driver of them. Within the normative pillar,
norms, values and roles are considered to provide structure for action
undertaken by the actor as well as the organisation. ‘Values’ define an
ideal standard against which the actions are assessed, whereas ‘norms’
define how ideal action can be taken (Scott 1995; Grosvold 2010). Taken
together, norms and values constitute a normative system that defines the
objectives while also serving as a road map that shows how we can attain
the defined objectives in a manner that will be deemed appropriate (Scott
1995, 37–8). Hansen and Ejersbo (2002) show how local government poli-
ticians and administrators are driven by different logic and thus create a
disharmony between the two spheres.
When studying whistleblowing in a Norwegian setting, we must include
the Norwegian model of labour relations as part of the framework. Norms
and values embedded in the model can be viewed as guidelines for appro-
priate methods of taking action – as whistleblowers as well as whistle-
blowers’ receivers (Scott 1995). In the public sector, all employees are
covered by a collective agreement that gives employees and trade union
representatives different channels for cooperation, co-determination and
participation. These arrangements can be considered to promote collective
as well as individual voices, and are believed to create a climate of coop-
eration, participation and trust. Information exchange and communication
takes place in formal and informal arenas. Furthermore, since 1979, there
has been a ‘‘Joint Declaration on Personnel Policy’1 (in Norwegian,
‘Samarbeidsavtalen mellom Fagforbundet og Arbeiderpartiet’) between
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local politicians from the Labour Party and the former Kommuneforbun-
det (now Fagforbundet) – the largest trade union in the public sector,
which is affiliated with the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions
(LO). The ties between the two parties have been and remain close.
Thus, the amendments in the Constitution and the WEA follow a tradi-
tion of corporate democracy in which two core concepts are participation
and co-determination. These statutory provisions reach far back in time
and culminated in 1977. Kalleberg (1983) has argued that the Norwegian
WEA was instrumental in establishing a more egalitarian society. The Act
not only served as a health reform for workers, but was also a key instru-
ment in promoting democracy in the workplace (Kalleberg, 1983). The
regulative and normative pillars will thus often mutually support each
other, as evidenced by the changes in the Constitution and the WEA.
Simultaneously, there have been changes that may create tensions. The
public sector in Norway, as well as that in a number of other Western
countries, has experienced substantial reforms over the past few decades
(Berge et al. 2009; Christensen et al. 2009). The reforms have affected the
organisational structures as well as the communication and information
flow from the top down and the other way around (Skivenes & Trygstad
2012). The changes were strongly influenced by NPM. Two central dimen-
sions are the flattening of organisational hierarchies and a separation
between the political and administrative spheres, with the latter also
underlined in the LGA. Fewer management levels are, in combination
with the separation of the two spheres, viewed as an important key to
increased efficiency and transparency (Skivenes & Trygstad 2008; 2012).
In the literature, it is normal to identify six elements in NPM reforms:
market basis, privatisation, decentralisation, focus on output, emphasis on
implementation and quality systems (cf. Hood 1991). Given the changes in
the LGA, many Norwegian municipalities are organised according to
NPM principles, emphasising the need to modernise, render more effec-
tive public administration and offer management the autonomy and right
to manage without political interference (Trygstad 2004; Christensen &
Lægreid 2007). Because a central feature in the NPM model is an
increased separation of the political and administrative levels (Goldsmith
& Larsen 2004), it follows that contact between administrative employees
and politicians should be limited. Although NPM has been disputed and
criticised in the last several years, the principles have not been abandoned.
It is still considered appropriate to limit contact between politicians and
the administration, and the ‘let the manager manage’ concept has strong
support (Skivenes & Trygstad 2015).
The picture that we have presented is complex and bears tensions
within and between pillars, as both the regular and normative pillars
involve forces that pull in opposite directions. This system may result in a
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seemingly stable situation, but beneath the stable surface, there may
be constant conflict between new and old rules and norms (Engelstad
2015, 38).
Local Government and Whistleblowing Research
The Norwegian public sector consists of three levels: the central govern-
ment, county councils and municipalities. These levels have different
responsibilities in terms of offering, providing and securing welfare services
for citizens. The central government oversees the courts, police, military,
universities and hospitals. The county councils are in charge of high schools,
cultural heritage and county roads. The local authorities (the municipalities)
have the primary responsibility of providing welfare services, such as com-
pulsory primary and secondary school services, health care services for the
elderly and other persons in need, and social security and child welfare
services. The local government or municipality has had a long-term and
strong standing in the Norwegian political system. Article 76 of the LGA
clearly states that the municipal and county councils have ‘the supreme
supervision of the municipal and county government’. At present, there are
428 municipalities in Norway, each led by elected politicians.
It is the politicians’ task to allocate resources and decide how to priori-
tise the different sectors, services and clients/users. It is extremely impor-
tant for politicians and citizens to be aware of the consequences of the
ineffective prioritisation of resources as well as any other forms of wrong-
doing that may seriously harm service users and/or citizens. Information
about such issues is a prerequisite for open and broad public discussion,
political elections, and reasonable prioritisation of sectors and services.
Thus, it follows that the information flows between administrative employ-
ees and politicians and between administration employees and the public
is important (Heywood 2002; Skivenes & Trygstad 2012). Denhardt and
Campbell (2006, 556), for example, underline the importance of leadership
in the public sector that explicitly addresses democratic norms and the
role of citizens in both formulating and realising public goals.
A review of the research on whistleblowing activity in Norway
(Skivenes & Trygstad 2012, 107ff) shows that typically more than half of
the employees that have experienced wrongdoing report it, usually to their
immediate supervisor first. The reporting rates appear to be connected to
respondents’ groups. In studies on managers, trade union representatives,
and health and safety delegates, whistleblowing activity is clearly higher
than in surveys that include ordinary employees. Respondents in the first
group may be regarded as ‘role reporters’. Brown (2008, xviii) defines a
‘role reporter’ as ‘[a] person who made a report in line with formal job
requirements related to their organisational role’.
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Regarding reactions to whistleblowing, an overview of eight Norwegian
studies on whistleblowing (Skivenes & Trygstad 2012, Chapter 5) shows that
7–18 percent of whistleblowers experienced retaliation. International studies
report higher sanction rates (Rothschild & Miethe 1999; Near et al. 2004;
Miceli et al. 2008). Regarding the effectiveness of whistleblowing (i.e.,
whether notification had an effect), 50–71 percent of respondents reported
that the misconduct was fully resolved or corrected. Studies that include sam-
ples of the entire Norwegian labour force indicate that more than eight out of
ten employees who had blown the whistle stated that they would do it again if
necessary (Matthiessen et al. 2008; Trygstad 2010; Staksrud et al. 2014).
Certainly, whistleblowing is not without risk, even in Norway, and
employees may be traumatised as a result of the harsh reaction following
the whistleblowing process (Bjørkelo 2010). However, the Norwegian
results on whistleblowing do differ from those reported in studies from the
United Kingdom and the United States, and we believe an important rea-
son for this is the labour market model used in Norway. Several studies
show that individual power resources, such as formal education, seniority
and hours at work, have a limited effect on Norwegian whistleblowing
activities and effects (Skivenes & Trygstad 2015). What seems to matter is
the presence of institutional arrangements in the workplace, such as trade
union representatives, health and safety delegates, collective agreements
and whistleblowing procedures. Such institutional arrangements (with the
addition of whistleblowing procedures in 2007) are well rooted in the Nor-
wegian (as well as the Nordic) labour market model, and are characterised
by well-established channels for cooperation, co-determination, participa-
tion and dialogue at different levels as well as social dialogue and tripartite
cooperation at the central level between sectors and industries from the top
management to the floor level. Contact between politicians and employees
may be considered a legitimate democratic right that can bring forward val-
uable information to those who govern on behalf of the citizens. The ques-
tion is how the contact pattern between politicians and employees, and the
use of politicians as a whistleblowing channel, plays out in the institution-
ally complex landscape described above.
Institutions changes slowly, and even though we do not have data to
study changes over time, we are able to investigate whether politicians in
municipalities with few management levels have less contact with the
administration compared with those in municipalities with several manage-
ment levels and how management levels correlate with politicians’ han-
dling of reported wrongdoing. Communication restrictions may benefit the
top management, but not necessarily the community and/or the service
users. In the next section, we present the methodological design and data
that we employ in our examination of acceptance of whistleblowing by
politicians; whether politicians receive whistleblowing cases and how those
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who do handle the case; and whether contact patterns matter with respect
to whistleblowing activity and the action taken by the politicians to
address wrongdoing.
Data and Methodology
The data consist of survey answers from politicians and administrative
employees from 20 municipalities with a population between 4,500 and
50,000.2 We chose these municipalities to secure representativeness with
respect to structure and organisation. A total of 14 of the municipalities in
the sample are characterised by a flat hierarchy, which indicates that there
is no more than one formal management level between the councillor and
the head of the unit. Flattening of organisational hierarchies is a key
dimension in NPM. We examine whether the flattening of organisational
hierarchies has any impact in our analyses with respect to contact pattern
between politicians and administrative employees and the politicians’ han-
dling of reported wrongdoing. In 2012, 36 percent of all Norwegian munic-
ipalities had no management levels between the chief municipal officer
and the service-producing unit, whereas 35 percent had one management
level (Blåka et al. 2012, 79).
We invited all politicians (N 5 661), managers, union representatives
and safety representatives in the education, child welfare, and nursing and
health care sectors from 20 Norwegian municipalities (a total of N 5 747)
to participate. The three sectors included are resource-intensive, and in
2014, 51 percent of the municipalities’ available funds were used in these
sectors.3 Although considerable resources are devoted to these sectors, a
common feeling among professionals and middle managers is that the
available resources are too scarce to meet the service users’ needs regard-
ing education, child welfare and health care (Skivenes & Trygstad 2012).
Both groups of respondents (politicians and staff) were asked to partici-
pate in the research project through an emailed letter with comprehensive
information and an electronic questionnaire attached. Those who wished
to participate completed the questionnaires; those who chose not to partic-
ipate were able to indicate so by clicking on a link. We collected data
from January to June 2009. The study was reported to the Norwegian
Data Protection official office. We used the online survey tool ‘Refleks’,
and the questions and vignettes were designed by the authors. Email
addresses were obtained via publicly accessible websites or by contacting
the local authorities via phone and letter. The response rate was 60 per-
cent for the politicians and 50 percent for the employees. The use of web
surveys may produce biases concerning our final sample because elderly
employees and politicians are more resistant to answering these types of
surveys. Furthermore, those who do not use computers as part of their job
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may be more difficult to contact. However, we consider our response rate
acceptable.
Previous studies suggested that employees in child welfare, health care
and education experience organisational wrongdoing to a greater extent
than employees in other sectors of the municipalities (Skivenes & Tryg-
stad 2006; Trygstad & Skivenes 2007). We invited unit managers, health
and safety delegates, and union representatives to participate in the survey
because they are obliged to report organisational wrongdoing (cf. Brown
2008). We also expected them, by virtue of their positions, to have a suffi-
cient level of knowledge of what transpires in the workplace and the com-
munity. In our analyses, we assembled health and safety delegates and
trade union representatives into one group.4
To map the communication between politicians and employees, we use a
simple indicator – namely, contact patterns.5 We believe that frequent con-
tact may influence how different actors perceive using politicians as whis-
tleblowing channels, how they evaluate different reasons for contacting
politicians, and the actual use of politicians as receivers of news of wrong-
doing. We determined the frequency by asking the politicians whether they
have contact with different actors inside the administration, including the
head of the administration, other top managers, middle managers,
employee representatives and employees. The politicians were asked
whether they had contact with one or several of these individuals every
second week or more (1), monthly (2), every second month (3), every half
a year (4), yearly or seldom (5). We excluded politicians who also work in
the municipalities because they have more frequent contact with other
employees than politicians who are not employed in the municipalities.
To examine whether politicians and employees consider whistleblowing
acceptable, we used the vignette method (cf. Finch 1987). We asked both
politicians and employees to assess the following fictive case:
Child welfare services in the community have, for some time, been struggling with high
sickness absenteeism and high turnover. According to one of the managers, this affects
the quality of the child welfare services as well as the working conditions for employees.
The problem has been addressed a number of times in administrative management meet-
ings without resulting in changes. One day, the manager sends an email to the mayor
and reports the conditions of the child welfare services. Is this acceptable?
The vignette describes two different sets of wrongdoing. One aspect relates
to the presence of a work environment characterised by excessive strain
caused by high sickness absenteeism (i.e., conditions that affect the health
of the employees), while the second aspect relates to service users, children
who are in vulnerable situations in which there may be need for attention.
The respondents were asked, ‘Do you find the action acceptable?’, and the
answers were coded 1 5 ‘yes’, 2 5 ‘no’ and 3 5 ‘I am not sure’.
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To study how the respondents evaluate different reasons for contact
between employees and politicians, we presented three different reasons
for employees to contact politicians: (1) to stop an incorrect decision; (2)
to stop wrongdoing; and (3) to provide additional information for a case.
We asked the respondents to evaluate the legitimacy of these reasons with
the following five-point Likert scale with answers coded as follows:
1 5 ‘totally agree’ to 5 5 ‘strongly disagree’.
To examine whether politicians received whistleblowing cases in the last
12 months and how they handled whistleblowing cases, we provided the
politicians with six different options for potential action: ‘I did nothing’
(1); ‘I investigated the case but did not find it serious enough to take
action’ (2); ‘I investigated the case and confronted the responsible person’
(3); ‘I investigated the case, confronted the responsible person and dis-
cussed the case in a meeting’ (4); ‘I investigated the case and reported it
to a supervisory authority’ (5); and ‘Other’ (6).
In this article, we use logistic regression to study the correlation
between politicians’ handling of whistleblowing cases and variables such
as contact with the administration, seniority, gender and the size of the
municipality. The interpretation of the effects is quite similar to linear
regression. Our dependent variable – the handling of the case – is a
dichotomous variable. Politicians who answered ‘I did nothing’ (1) or ‘I
investigated the case but did not find it serious enough to do anything’ are
coded as 0, indicating no action, whereas politicians who answered ‘I
investigated the case and confronted the responsible person’ (3); ‘I investi-
gated the case, confronted the responsible person and discussed the case
in a meeting’ (4) or ‘I investigated the case and reported it to a supervi-
sory authority’ (5) are coded as 1, denoting action. Value 6, ‘Other’, is
excluded.
We use different independent variables in the regression analysis. When
investigating whether the politicians’ handling of wrongdoing is correlated
with the politicians’ contact with actors in the administration, we coded
those who have contact with administration employees every second
month and more seldom as 0 (seldom contact) and those who have con-
tact more often than every second month as 1 (frequent contact). We
then created an index in which those who answered that they only have
contact with administration employees seldom or never were coded as 0,
those who have contact with one group or actor were coded as 1, those
who have contact with two groups or actors were coded as 2, and so on
up to 5.
To study whether the number of management levels influences the con-
tact pattern, we compared the answers from politicians in flat municipal-
ities (up to one level) with those in municipalities with two or more
management levels. Those in the first group are coded 0, and those in the
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second group are coded 1. Previous studies have shown that whistleblow-
ing routines affect whistleblowing processes in a positive way. Politicians
in municipalities who have written whistleblowing procedures are coded 0;
those who do not are coded 1. Those who answered ‘unsure’ are coded as
missing. We have also included guidelines for contact between the politi-
cians and administration as one indicator that may correlate with the han-
dling of whistleblowing cases. These types of guidelines do sometimes
intend to limit contact. Politicians who answer ‘yes’ are coded 0; those
who answer ‘no’ are coded 1; those who answer ‘unsure’ are coded as
missing.
Regarding control variables, we used gender, age and seniority. The lit-
erature indicates that gender may affect the ability to blow the whistle,
but as noted by Miceli et al. (2012), the effect is inconsistent. Miethe
(1999) finds that men are more likely to blow the whistle. Miceli et al.
(2012, 949) also find that women are somewhat more likely to act on
observed wrongdoing. Although our focus is on people informed about
whistleblowing, we include gender in our analysis. The reason for includ-
ing seniority and age as control variables is also related to previous find-
ings. Research has suggested that employees with less at stake are more
frequently inactive observers (Miceli et al. 2012). If this description is suit-
able for whistleblower receivers as well, there is a need for investigation.
The control variables were coded as follows: women were coded as 0 and
men were coded as 1. Age and seniority are numerical variables. Ages
range from 18 to 70, and seniority ranges from 0 to more than 50 years.
There are limitations to our study. We have a sample of politicians and
employees from three different sectors from Norwegian municipalities that
are small or medium-sized. Because we do not know the complete uni-
verse, we are not able to conclude whether our sample is representative. If
we compare age and gender among leaders in our sample with those
among municipal leaders in general based on the Living Condition Survey
from 2012 (http://www.ssb.no), we find that the leaders in our sample are
slightly older; the average age is 49 compared with 46 in the LCS. Regard-
ing gender, we have slightly more men in our sample (32 percent) com-
pared with the average among municipal leaders in the LCS (29 percent).
The vignette method is particularly useful in comparing and teasing out
attitudes and values pertaining to a specific matter but may be limited by
an unrealistic case scenario in which respondents conflate the vignette
with a real case they have experienced or in which the answers do not
represent the participant’s opinions but others’ opinions. Based on our
research experience, we should have a realistic case scenario, but we can-
not be sure (a problem encountered in all studies involving self-reported
information) whether the responses have been influenced by other themes.
The responses to a vignette are certainly not the same as those produced
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in real life, but we do not have reason to believe that actual responses in
this respect will be very much different.
Findings
Contact Patterns
We asked how often politicians are in contact with different actors in the
administration about issues concerning their work. The frequency is
reported in Figure 1. Politicians have contact most frequently with ordi-
nary employees (44 percent every second week or more often), the top
manager (37 percent every second week or more often) and the councillor
(35 percent every second week or more often). The most common expla-
nation for this contact pattern is participation in regular meetings (63 per-
cent). However, 58 percent of the politicians also reported that they and
administration employees have direct contact with one another. Contact
between politicians and middle management and employee representatives
is less common: 25 percent of middle management report that they have
contact every second week or more often, whereas the same proportion
for politicians’ contact with employee representatives is 8 percent. Fur-
thermore, 41 percent of the politicians answered that they have contact
with employee representatives yearly or more seldom. Different
Figure 1. Politicians Contact with Different Groups of Employees (N 5 325).
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management levels have no significant effect on the politicians’ contact
patterns with the administration.
Response to the Vignette: Is It Acceptable to Report Misconduct to the
Mayor?
We first outline what politicians, managers and employee representatives
regard as appropriate methods of action with regard to whistleblowing,
and second, what the respondents perceive as legitimate reasons for con-
tact between the politicians and administration. In the vignette, the man-
ager first reported the misconduct to a group of managers in the
municipality, and after no action was taken, the manager reported the
misconduct to the mayor. We asked whether reporting the misconduct to
the mayor is acceptable, and as shown in Table 1, nearly nine out of ten
politicians answer ‘yes’, compared with 75 percent of employee represen-
tatives and 66 percent of managers. There is a high degree of acceptance
for the manager’s action as described in the vignette, especially among
politicians but also among employee representatives. One out of four
managers finds the described action inappropriate.
Legitimate Reasons for Contacting Politicians
Figure 2 shows three different reasons that more than 50 percent of politi-
cians, managers, and employee representatives consider legitimate in
terms of contacting politicians. Superiors and managers consider all three
reasons for contact to be significantly less legitimate than do politicians
and employee representatives. Moreover, 56 percent of the superiors/man-
agers answer that they totally or partly agree that it is acceptable to con-
tact politicians to add information to a case or to prevent a poor decision
from being made. With regard to stopping wrongdoing, the corresponding
share is 68 percent. By contrast, employee representatives consider two of
the three reasons for contact to be more legitimate than the other two
groups do, except for ‘to stop wrongdoing’. For this statement, politicians
and employee representatives report the same degree of acceptance: 79
percent answer that they totally or partly agree that this is an acceptable
Table 1. Is It Acceptable to Use the Mayor as a Channel for Whistleblowing? (Percent;
N 5 774)
Yes No Not sure Total
Politicians 89 8 3 100
Managers 66 25 9 100
Employee representatives 75 10 15 100
Total 80 12 8 100
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reason for contacting politicians. Politicians are placed between the two
other groups with regard to the other statements.
Politicians as Receivers of Whistleblowing Cases
In what way are politicians involved in the whistleblowing process? Do
they receive reports about embezzlement or bullying, users who suffer
from a lack of resources, or children with special needs who are receiving
insufficient help or care? Nearly two out of three politicians in our sample
had received reports about wrongdoing one or more times in the last 12
months. In Figure 3, we show how the politicians in our study responded
when they received a report on wrongdoing.
The most common reaction is to investigate the matter, confront the
responsible person and discuss the matter in a meeting. Moreover, 14 per-
cent brought the issue directly to a supervisor, whereas two confronted
the presumed responsible person. Almost one out of five politicians took
no further action, either by doing nothing (7 percent) or by investigating
the matter (12 percent) and then doing nothing because the matter was
not serious enough to merit further action. In the end, 5 percent answered
‘other’. The majority of the politicians in our survey actively respond
when they receive reports of wrongdoing in the municipality.
We also find a clear and significant correlation between politicians’ con-
tact with the administration and the handling of the reported wrongdoing,
as indicated in Figure 4. Politicians who have frequent contact with
employee representatives also receive more reports of wrongdoing
Figure 2. Do Employee Representatives, Superiors/Managers and Politicians Find It
Acceptable that Employees Contact Politicians to . . .. Totally and Partly Agree (N 5 773).
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Figure 3. Politicians’ Responses to Wrongdoing (N 5 264).
Figure 4. Politicians Who Have Received a Whistleblowing Case in the Last 12 Months
and Who Did Take Action, Categorised by the Contact Frequency (N 5 245).
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compared with politicians who have less frequent contact with employee
representatives (75 versus 62 percent). Management level does not have
any significant impact.
Politicians who have frequent contact with the councillor, top manage-
ment, middle management and employees appear to take a far more pro-
active approach to notifications of wrongdoing. Frequent contact with
employee representatives does not have the same effect, but it should be
noted that relatively few politicians have frequent contact with this group,
which of course would affect the results. The logistic regression analysis
displayed in Table 2 shows that the politicians’ contact with the adminis-
tration affects the dependent variable of the handling of the case. Politi-
cians who have frequent or regular contact with the administration are
more likely to report having taken action regarding the reported wrong-
doing. The regression analysis shows that the guidelines for contact with
the administration, whistleblowing procedures, size of the municipality,
management level, gender, age and, as mentioned above, seniority of the
politicians have no significant impact on the politicians’ handling of
reported wrongdoing.
Discussion and Concluding Remarks
The two main findings of this study are that contact between politicians
and administrative employees is common and that the degree of contact
between politicians and administrative employees is positively correlated
with politicians who take action to address whistleblowing cases. These
findings contradict central elements of the regulative and normative pil-
lars, in which the separation between the political and administrative
Table 2. Logistic Regression Analysis: Probability of Politicians Taking Action (0 5 Did
Not Handle the Case; 1 5 Handled the Case)
B Standard error
Seniority as a politician 0.000 0.065
Gender (0 5 woman) 21.23 0.77
Age 0.072** 0.032
Contact with the administration 0.638*** 0.206
Size of the municipality 20.1 0.448
Guidelines for contact with the administrations (0 5 yes) 0.28 10046.495





Cox & Snell R2 0.24
Note: **Significant at the p< 0.05 level; ***significant at the p< 0.01 level.
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spheres and the managerial prerogative is underlined in the LGA as well
as in NPM.
Contact between politicians and employees is not correlated with man-
agement level. In light of institutional changes in legislation and the influ-
ence of NPM, these findings are interesting because they contradict the
premise that the contact pattern between politicians and employees should
follow a trajectory through the mayor and councillors. Instead, the results
indicate that the tensions within the regulative pillar neutralise the inten-
tion of NPM. Hence, it appears that we have a situation in which changes
in the regulative and normative pillars move in different directions. The
sentiment gathered from Scott (1995) is that the regulative and normative
pillars usually support each other, but when the regulative pillar simulta-
neously prescribes more freedom of speech and less communication
between administrative employees and the politicians, tensions that pull
the pillars in different directions may arise, as our analysis indicates. As
noted by Engelstad (2015), when old and new rules co-exist, the interplay
between them may vary significantly. One important explanation is the
mobilisation of interests and power. Our analysis shows only small differ-
ences in the politicians’ contact patterns with top management and
employees; there is a greater share of politicians who have more contact
with employees, every second week or more often, than with top manage-
ment or the councillor. The vignette study also indicates a high degree of
support for reporting misconduct to the mayor. In the vignette, the man-
ager first followed the organisational structure in reporting the misconduct
before turning to the mayor. Empirical research indicates that Norwegian
employees follow formal authority structures when reporting misconduct
in the organisation: They first approach their immediate supervisor before
moving to the management level above. This form of reporting has a high
level of legitimacy in the Norwegian workforce (Skivenes & Trygstad
2006, 2012). However, when the respondents were asked whether it is
acceptable for employees to contact politicians to stop wrongdoing, we
obtain the same picture. This finding indicates that the severity of the case
legitimises contact and that perceptions are slightly less positive when we
ask whether it is acceptable to contact politicians to add information to a
case or to stop a poor decision from being made.
Our analyses indicate that managers have a more restricted attitude
toward the legitimate reasons for contacting politicians compared with
politicians and employee representatives, regardless of the reasons for
contact. One explanation can be that superiors and managers are more
concerned with separation between the political and administrative levels
than are politicians and employee representatives. Viewed from a manage-
ment perspective, it may be beneficial to limit the contact between politi-
cians and employees/employee representatives because such contact can
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disturb and even change decisions made by management. This contact can
also undermine management’s authority, which may indicate that the
focus on management’s right to manage, which is strongly emphasised in
NPM, has affected managers’ perception of appropriate action but not
necessarily on the other actors’ perceptions. It seems reasonable to assume
that the frequent contact between politicians and employees can explain
the fact that nearly two out of three politicians in our study have received
reports of wrongdoing in the last 12 months. We consider this number to
be high compared with figures reported in other studies in which top man-
agers are asked the same question.
Our findings indicate that the separation between the political and
administrative spheres is not as strict as the LGA and NPM prescribe.
Politicians appear to be regarded as an important whistleblower channel.
It seems reasonable to relate these findings to ‘tradition’ or path depend-
ency. The politicians’ contact with administration has deep roots in many
Norwegian municipalities and can be considered part of the normative pil-
lar. Highly institutionalised practices are difficult to change, especially
when there is little to gain for the actors involved (Mahoney & Thelen
2010). Information about wrongdoing can be essential for politicians with
respect to influence and power. This type of information can also be
essential with respect to control and democracy. The need for critical
information about wrongdoing is therefore in conflict with the rationale
behind the separation between politics and the administration. In our
study, the majority of politicians claim that they investigated the matter
and contacted the person in question. Our analyses indicate that politi-
cians with frequent contact with actors inside the municipal organisation
also seem to have a more proactive attitude towards handling whistleblow-
ing cases. This finding supports our expectation that communication
between the political and the administrative levels in practice may have a
positive impact on the whistleblowing process even though approximately
20 percent of politicians did not go forward with the reports on
wrongdoing.
Previous research has shown that observed wrongdoing may be the
result of a misunderstanding. We do, however, consider the chances of
misunderstanding small when the matter is reported to politicians because
most employees will likely have notified other agencies or parties in
advance (according to official channels). Thus, by that time, any misunder-
standings will have likely been resolved. The reason ‘not serious enough’
may therefore include cases in which the politician and whistleblower
have different thresholds regarding what constitutes serious wrongdoing
and how the matter should be handled.
We regard these findings as noteworthy; as an institutional practice that
has normative and regulative support, frequent contact between politicians
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and employees may increase the information that politicians receive,
which may include critical information. This practice may increase the
likelihood that politicians actively respond to misconduct cases. In our
study, contact between the administrative and political levels in the munic-
ipal organisation indicates a benefit to the entire municipal organisation
by informing those with formal and actual power to take action about
wrongdoing. This information may be of great importance for service
users, citizens and employees in the municipalities. Moreover, vulnerable
groups, such as children in the child welfare system, students and the
elderly, have a greater chance of being heard by their elected representa-
tives. We argue that it is vital for politicians and citizens to be informed
of not only the situation of service users in the local community, but also
the working conditions of frontline professionals. Politicians need informa-
tion about unacceptable incidents and practices in municipalities so that
they can improve policies, correct unintended consequences of misaligned
policies and optimise the allocation of resources.
Whether the regulations on separation between politicians and adminis-
trative staff contribute to greater transparency between the two spheres and
render politicians capable of making reasonable and more qualified deci-
sions is, however, debatable (Skivenes & Trygstad 2008). It is clear that the
regulations create tension and produce contradictory signals, indicating that
contact and communication must use the strict mayor-councillor channel or
that the established contact patterns must stay active. Whistleblowing is an
activity that goes beyond regular communication within an organisation
that may harm employees, service users, patients or even citizens.
One way of ensuring that politicians receive such information is by facil-
itating communication and maintaining communication streams between
employees and politicians in local governments. This recommendation
runs contrary to the approach adopted in NPM and the LGA, both of
which designate the mayor and the councillor as the main contact points
in municipalities. We regard this approach as an organisational limitation
that does not promote sufficient information exchange and communication
between politicians and administrative employees, potentially reducing the
quality of local government discussions on political matters. However,
changes in the Constitution and in the WEA underline the importance of
the freedom of expression and whistleblowing. These changes, along with
the historical tradition in Norway of communication and participation
between employers and employees and between politicians and the
administration, seem to have neutralised the intention of the LGA and
NPM. It appears that the interplay between old and new rules give rise to
tension, or a sort of status quo. The managers in our study underline this
sentiment. The managers find it less acceptable that employees contact
politicians than politicians, indicating the impact of this important
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dimension in the regulative and normative pillars. One explanation can be
that managers have a stronger obligation to and greater respect for the
formal structures in the organisation and hence tend to follow the lines of
communication in the organisation. However, managers may benefit from
less communication with (and interference from) politicians because a
strict separation may provide the managers increased authority and power
within the organisation. Unlike politicians, managers have much to gain
by emphasising this separation.
Municipalities in Norway are governed by local politicians who shall
ensure that citizens are addressed in a fair and reliable manner and that
statutory responsibilities are met. Being a politician involves making diffi-
cult decisions regarding the prioritisation of scarce resources in a situation
in which different groups compete. We have discussed changes in the reg-
ulative and normative pillars that may affect both contact patterns and
handling of wrongdoing. On the one hand, we would expect the contact
pattern between politicians and employees (i.e., the use of politicians as
receivers of whistleblowing reports) to be modest. On the other hand, we
have argued that changing institutionalised practises and actions is diffi-
cult. Our findings indicate that contact and information exchange, includ-
ing reporting wrongdoing, between the political and administrative levels
contributes to producing more active politicians. It is particularly encour-
aging that frequent contact between politicians and employees leads to a
high degree of action regarding reported wrongdoing. This finding may
indicate that contacting a politician can be beneficial for both the whistle-
blowing case and the employee who blows the whistle. Further research
needs to be performed before we can generalise our results. However, our
findings indicate that, according to politicians, it is common for employees
to directly contact them, and vice versa. This level of contact between pol-
iticians and administrative employees stands in contrast with the focus
over the past decades in Norway on separation between the political and
administrative government spheres, as encouraged in the international lit-
erature on New Public Management.
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NOTES
1. Samarbeidsavtalen mellom Fagforbundet og Arbeiderpartiet, 2012. It is available online
at: http://www.fagforbundet.no/om-fagforbundet/samfunnsomradet/?article_id596380
2. The municipalities are: Bjugn, Fauske, Haram, Holmestrand, Lillesand, Risør, Flora,
Førde, Kongsvinger, Kvinnherad, Os in Hordaland, Stange, Time, Voss, Bodø, Hauge-
sund, Nedre Eiker, Rana, Steinkjer and Stjørdal. The first six municipalities have
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between 4,500 and 10,000 inhabitants; the next eight have between 11,000 and 20,000
inhabitants; and the last six have between 21,000 and 50,000 inhabitants.
3. http://utdanningsspeilet.udir.no/innhold/kapittel-4/4-2-kommunene-bruker-23-prosent-
av-midlene-pa-grunnskolen
4. For further information, see Skivenes & Trygstad (2012).
5. A presentation of the variables used in multivariate analyses is in the Appendix.
Appendix. Variables Used in Multivariate Analysis
Below we present the distribution of variables used in multivariate
analyses.
Politicians Contact with Different Groups in the Administration: Means
and Standard Deviation
Politicians Handling of Whistleblowing Cases (Several Choices Possi-





















Valid 397 398 394 393 395
Missing 3 2 6 7 5
Mean 2,1738 2,0251 2,5051 3,6794 2,2127
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Age and Seniority as a Politician
Politicians handling of the case Percent Frequency
I did nothing 7 19
I investigated the case but did not find it serious
enough to take action
12 30
I investigated the case and confronted the
responsible person
20 53
I investigated the case, confronted the responsible
person and discussed the case in a meeting
42 110
I investigated the case and reported it to a supervisory authority 14 37
Other 5 14








Are guidelines for guidelines for contact between the politicians








N Mean Standard deviation Standard error mean
Age 379 32,49 11,273 0,579
Seniority 400 9,0925 6,73255 0,33663
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